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IN DEFENCE OF MAGICAL ERSATZISM
B D A. D
David Lewis’ objection to a generic theory of modality which he calls ‘magical ersatzism’ is that its
linchpin, a relation he calls ‘selection’, must be either an internal or an external relation, and that
this is unintelligible either way. But the problem he points out with classifying selection as internal is
really just an instance of the general problem of how we manage to grasp underdetermined predicates,
is not peculiar to magical ersatzism, and is amenable to some familiar solutions. He provides no
compelling grounds for thinking that classifying selection as external is unintelligible, and his
argument has a false presupposition. I conclude that magical ersatzism is still a viable option in the
metaphysics of modality.
In his magnificent On the Plurality of Worlds David Lewis explains why he
rejects a generic theory of modality he calls ‘magical ersatzism’.1 Here I
argue that his objections fail.
I. MAGICAL ERSATZISM
Magical ersatzism (hereafter M) runs as follows. There are certain abstract
simple ‘elements’, causally inert entities that lack any mereological or set-
theoretic structure. There is the concrete world, the mereological sum of
every concrete particular that actually exists (‘I and all my surroundings’).
And there is a binary relation, ‘selection’, that the concrete world bears to
some but not all of the elements.
Whether or not the concrete world selects some element
... depend[s] on what goes on within the concrete world. For instance, there are some
elements that cannot be selected unless there is a talking donkey included as a part
within the concrete world. And there is one element such that, necessarily, it is
selected if and only if there is a talking donkey (PW, p. ).
1 D.K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, ), §. (hereafter PW ). He
raises similar objections in ‘Against Structural Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
(), pp. –.
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This dependence allows us to think of the elements as ‘representational’:
element e represents that so and so =df necessarily, if the concrete world
selects e, then so and so. And it allows us to define a relation of ‘implication’
among them: element e implies element e* =df necessarily, if the concrete
world selects e, then it also selects e*.
(M) also includes two principles about the elements. First, they constitute
a plenitude: for each distinct way the concrete world might be, there is some
distinct element e such that, necessarily, the concrete world selects e iff the
concrete world is that way. Secondly, they constitute a complete atomic
Boolean algebra under the implication relation. Lewis (PW, p. ) points
out that
In this Boolean algebra, there are many elements, called maximal, that are not implied
by other elements.... Necessarily, no matter what goes on within the concrete world,
one and only one of the maximal elements will be selected. Then the selected
elements will be exactly those which the maximal element implies.
These maximal elements are (M)’s ‘worlds’.
Finally, (M) relates all this to modality by adopting the familiar Leib-
nizian schema (L): it is possible that so and so iff some world represents that
so and so. So (M) entails, for instance, that it is possible that there are talking
donkeys iff some world represents that there are talking donkeys, in other
words, iff there is some maximal element that can be selected only if there
are talking donkeys.
Lewis points out that (M) is more schema than theory. It is uncommitted
on whether the elements are sui generis or already familiar members of
our ontology; it is uncommitted on how selection works (i.e., on how the
elements represent what they do); and it contains no explanation for the two
principles, and no analysis of the modality they employ. In fact, he points
out, if the elements were not required to be abstract simples, all Leibnizian
accounts of modality would qualify as instances of (M), including even his
own modal realism:
... maybe the elements are the sets of worlds, the concrete world selects just those
elements that have it as a member, and ... an element [represents] that a donkey talks
iff each world in that element has a talking donkey as a part.2
The requirement that the elements are abstract simples is supposed to
disqualify modal realism. It also disqualifies ‘linguistic ersatzism’, whose
analogues of the elements are set-theoretically complex, and ‘pictorial
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2 PW, p. . By ‘world’ here Lewis means not a maximal element but something like a
maximally spatiotemporally inter-related concrete particular (PW, §., pp. ff.). (M)’s max-
imal elements correspond to the unit sets of Lewis’ worlds. (However, in one sense, unit sets
are themselves abstract simples.)
ersatzism’, whose analogues of the elements are mereologically complex, to
both of which Lewis has other objections (see PW, pp. –). But a large
number of theories do still qualify; Lewis mentions those of Plantinga,
Stalnaker, van Inwagen, Slote, and Prior and Fine.3 And therein lies the
interest of (M). For any objections to it are at once objections to a
large number of theories. Indeed, Lewis’ objections constitute a crucial part
of his argument that modal realism is preferable to all rival theories of
modality.
II. A SUMMARY OF LEWIS’ OBJECTIONS TO (M)
These objections to (M) focus on its linchpin, the relation of selection. The
magical ersatzer adopts ‘selects’ as a primitive, and need not speculate on
the nature of the selection relation. But we do know that selection must have
whatever features are necessary for playing the role which (M) implicitly
defines for it. And this alone, Lewis thinks, provides sufficient traction to
refute (M).
In outline, he argues as follows. () Selection must be either an ‘internal’
or an ‘external’ relation. But () an internal relation capable of playing the
role which (M) defines for selection would be ungraspable; and () it is
unintelligible how an external relation could play this role at all. Either way,
then, ‘selects’ is unintelligible, even when taken as a primitive. And a
genuinely unintelligible notion cannot be made intelligible by further ana-
lysis. So (M) and all its instances should be rejected.
Because (M) is so schematic, this argument, if successful, constitutes an
extraordinary tour de force. It shows that most Leibnizian theories of modality
are not just false but literally unintelligible, all without assuming anything to
distinguish them from modal realism except that their elements are abstract
simples.
III. PREMISE (): SELECTION MUST BE EITHER
AN INTERNAL OR AN EXTERNAL RELATION
A relation is internal iff it supervenes on the intrinsic natures of the relata
‘considered separately’, i.e., iff it cannot vary among (intrinsic) duplicates of
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3 A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford UP, ); R. Stalnaker, ‘Possible Worlds’,
Noûs,  (), pp. –; P. van Inwagen, ‘Indexicality and Actuality’, Philosophical Review, 
(), pp. –; M. Slote, Metaphysics and Essence (Oxford: Blackwell, ), pp. –;
A.N. Prior and K. Fine, Postscript to Worlds, Times, and Selves (London: Duckworth, );
P. Forrest, ‘Ways Worlds Could Be’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,  (), pp. –.
the relata.4 Candidate internal relations include being-taller-than and being-
the-same-colour-as: if x is taller than y or is the same colour as y, then any
duplicate of x is also taller than or the same colour as any duplicate of y.
A relation is external iff it is not internal, but still supervenes on the
intrinsic nature of the mereological sum of the relata, i.e., if it cannot vary
among duplicates of the relata whenever the sum of these duplicates is a
duplicate of the sum of the relata. External relations are non-internal
relations that depend only on the qualitative natures of the relata and on
other ways in which the relata are related, regardless of the state or existence
(or non-existence) of anything else. Candidates include spatiotemporal
relations such as being-one-metre-from: x could be one metre from y while a
duplicate of x still fails to be one metre from a duplicate of y, even though
whether x is one metre from y is still intrinsic to their sum. In fact, Lewis
(PW, pp. ff.) claims that spatiotemporal, or at least analogically spatio-
temporal, relations are the only external relations we know of.
Finally, some relations are neither internal nor external; they can vary
among duplicates of the relata even when the sum of these duplicates is a
duplicate of the sum of the relata. Roughly, these are relations that depend
on something other than the relata or other ways in which they are related.
Candidates include having-the-same-owner-as and being-more-popular-than.
Lewis rejects the suggestion that selection might be neither internal nor
external. How could whether or not the concrete world selects a particular
element depend on anything other than the sum of the concrete world and
that element? What else could it possibly depend on? And anyway even if it
did, Lewis (PW, p. ) writes that this ‘would presumably make it equi-
valent to an external relation of the elements to something even more
inclusive than the concrete world’, in which case it would still be subject to
(a suitable adaptation of ) the objection he raises against classifying it as
external. I shall take it as agreed that selection is either internal or external.
IV. PREMISE (): AN INTERNAL SELECTION RELATION
WOULD BE UNGRASPABLE
Selection cannot be grasped by ostension, because no one can have
causal interaction with any of its instances – (M)’s elements are causally
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4 Roughly, the intrinsic nature of a thing is the conjunction of its intrinsic properties. An
intrinsic property is one that something has (or lacks) per se, in and of itself, regardless of the
state or existence (or non-existence) of any distinct thing; intrinsic properties cannot vary
among duplicates. Candidate intrinsic properties include shapes, colours, charges, masses and
lengths.
inert.5 Nor can selection be grasped via a list (even if the elements were
namable) because the concrete world instantiates infinitely many distinct
properties, so there must be infinitely many distinct selected elements – far
too many to list. That leaves only one possibility: grasping it by grasping
some defining condition on the relata, some condition of the form
S. x selects y iff (P1x & Q1y) or (P2x & Q 2 y) or ...6
where the P-properties (‘the Ps’) are properties that the concrete world
might instantiate (‘ways it might be’), and the Q-properties (‘the Qs’) are
properties instantiated by the elements in virtue of which they represent
what they do (‘representational’ properties). But, Lewis argues, no one could
grasp an instance of (S), at least if selection is internal. Hence an internal
selection relation would be ungraspable, except perhaps by magic.
To expose the problem with grasping an instance of (S) I shall focus on
the Q-properties. These are instantiated by the elements, so they must be at
least capable of instantiation by abstract simples. And there must be at least
2 of them. For if the elements are to constitute a plenitude, there must be a
distinct Q-property for each distinct possible way the concrete world might
be, and there are at least 2 distinct ways the concrete world might be.7
Finally, if selection is an internal relation, one that supervenes on the
intrinsic natures of the relata considered separately, the Q-properties must
be intrinsic.
The problem is that we are actually acquainted with very few intrinsic
properties even capable of instantiation by abstract simples, far too few for
us ever to grasp a specific instance of (S). We are not acquainted with any –
and this includes the Qs themselves – via causal interaction with the
elements, of course, because the elements are inert. Lewis writes that
Properties of charge, mass, quark colour and flavour, and the like, might perhaps do
(if they could somehow be shared by abstract simples ...).
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5 In this section and §VI, I present reconstructions of Lewis’ arguments. Since Lewis’ own
presentation of the arguments is very compressed, I cannot be sure that my reconstructions
are accurate. But it seems to me that the reconstructed arguments are interesting and worthy
of consideration anyway.
6 This is slightly different from how Lewis actually states the schema. My version assumes
that propositions can be thought of as properties of the actual world. This is harmless, and
makes the discussion of premises () and () clearer.
7 Here is a well known argument to show that there must be at least 2 distinct ways the
concrete world might be. There are, or at least might have been, continuum-many space-time
points. Each could either be occupied by some matter or be vacant. And whether or not a
particular space-time point is occupied or vacant is independent of whether any other point is
occupied or vacant. So any pattern of occupancy and vacancy is a way the concrete world
is or might be. And there are 2 such patterns. See W.V. Quine, ‘Propositional Objects’, in his
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia UP, ), pp. –.
Unfortunately, there are at most continuum-many of those properties; yet, as
we know, there must be at least 2 Q-properties. Thus (PW, p. )
... there are not nearly enough of those properties to make all the differences we need.
So at least the great majority of the [Q-properties] must lie entirely outside our
acquaintance. Then it is a mystery how anyone could have understood the predicate
‘selects’, which is supposed to express an internal relation that involves these
properties. If the ersatzer has understood his own primitive, he must have done it by
magic.
Lewis envisages the magical ersatzer as responding that we grasp the Qs by
description rather than by acquaintance, via what they represent: one is the
property of representing that there are talking donkeys; another is the pro-
perty of representing that there are blue swans; etc. But, as he points out,
this response is question-begging. For ‘representation’ is defined by (M) in
terms of selection; it is not an independent notion. So the descriptions
themselves are graspable only if selection is.
V. WHY THE ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE () IS UNCONVINCING
This argument is difficult and abstract; van Inwagen calls it ‘profoundly
tricky’ and talks of its ‘mazes’.8 But so far as I understand it, it seems flawed.
In this section, I discuss two responses.
V.. Response : naturalness
It is a Moorean fact that somehow or other we grasp many properties and
relations whose extensions are at least partly beyond our acquaintance. We
grasp addition and greenness, for instance, despite lacking acquaintance
with instances that would distinguish them from quaddition and grueness.
Lewis himself has suggested a general explanation of how we manage it:
nature treats the candidates differently – addition is just more natural than
quaddition, greenness more natural than grueness.9 So perhaps nature has
obliged here too. Each specific instance of (S) corresponds to a specific
pairing of the Ps and Qs (i.e., a one–one function from the Ps to the Qs).
Perhaps one such pairing is more natural than the others. I shall call it ‘Rn’,
whichever one it is.10 Naturalness, unlike representation, is independent of
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8 P. van Inwagen, ‘Two Concepts of Possible Worlds’, in P.A. French et al. (eds), Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, : Studies in Essentialism (Univ. of Minnesota Press, ), pp. –.
9 See, e.g., Lewis, ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,  (),
pp. –.
10 If the following response is to be viable, Rn ought also to be an ‘eligible’ relation, in the
sense discussed below. For clarity, I shall ignore this complication. It does not affect the point.
selection. So the magical ersatzer can exploit Rn to grasp particular Qs by
description without begging the question after all: one is the Q-property
which Rn pairs with the property of having donkeys as parts; another is the
Q-property which Rn pairs with the property of having blue swans as parts;
and so on. The ersatzer can also exploit Rn to grasp a determinate meaning
for ‘selects’:
Sn. x selects y iff there is a P-property P and a Q-property Q such that Rn(P,Q)
and Px and Qy.
Roughly, the concrete world selects just those elements whose intrinsic
properties are ‘naturally paired’ with its own. And (Sn) is easily graspable. In
particular, it does not presuppose a grasp of a sufficient number of the Qs
‘to make all the differences we need’. In fact, it does not presuppose a grasp
of any specific Qs at all. (Sn) quantifies over the Qs, rather than containing
predicates for them.11 (Anyway, grasping enough Qs to make all the differ-
ences we need would mean grasping 2 Q-properties, which is impossible
regardless of what they are like. No extant Leibnizian theory of modality
would be intelligible if this were required.)
It would be misguided to complain here that there is no independent
evidence that one pairing is more natural than any other. For there is never
independent evidence that one relation or property is more natural than the
competing candidates. Rather, the fact of successful reference itself con-
stitutes the evidence – naturalness just is whatever accounts for reference to
a specific candidate despite underdetermination by all (other) evidence.
Addition and greenness must be more natural than quaddition and grueness
precisely because otherwise we could not refer to them, which obviously we
do (see Lewis, ‘Putnam’s Paradox’). Moreover, Lewis says that he is attack-
ing the graspability of a natural internal selection relation, and what else
could this be but one that supervenes on a natural relation among the
intrinsic properties of the relata?
In short, if one pairing of the Ps and Qs is more natural than any other,
then the magical ersatzer has the resources to grasp many of the Qs and a
determinate meaning for ‘selects’ after all.
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©  The Author    Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
11 There is nothing unusual about grasping internal relations via quantification over the
properties on which they depend. Presumably, we grasped (perfect) duplication, for instance,
by grasping ‘x is a duplicate of y iff there is an intrinsic nature that they share (or perhaps x is a duplicate
of y iff they share all their intrinsic properties). Indeed, duplication shares all the relevant features of
selection: it cannot be grasped by ostension, for there are no actual pairs of (perfect) duplicates
that we are acquainted with; its possible instances are far too numerous for us to list; and the
great majority of the properties it involves – intrinsic natures (or perhaps intrinsic properties
generally) – are not actually instantiated, and so lie beyond our acquaintance. Yet a theory
that takes ‘duplicates’ as primitive need not be unintelligible.
V.. Response : vagueness
I shall call any arbitrary binary relation under which the elements constitute
a complete atomic Boolean algebra an ‘implication relation’. This is a
purely structural matter. Whether a relation qualifies as an implication
relation does not depend on the identity or nature of the relata, the elements
themselves; it depends only on the pattern of the relation’s distribution
among them. So there are innumerable implication relations. (M)’s second
principle guarantees that there is at least one. Another is generated by any
permutation of the elements that leaves the structure untouched. (M)’s first
principle effectively guarantees there are many such permutations.
Clearly, for each implication relation I, there is a way of pairing the Ps
and Qs so that the structure imposed by I on the elements reflects the struc-
ture of the relations among the Ps. That is, for each implication relation I,
there is a pairing RI such that element e bears I to element e* iff there are
properties P and P* such that the concrete world cannot instantiate P with-
out also instantiating P*, and e instantiates the Q-property paired by RI
with P while e* instantiates the Q-property paired by RI with P*. And each
such pairing in turn determines a candidate selection relation, selectsI: x
selectsI y iff there is a P-property P and a Q-property Q such that RI(P,Q)
and Px and Qy. When a candidate selection relation is derived from an
implication relation in this way, I call it ‘eligible’. Clearly there are also
innumerable eligible candidate selection relations.
(M) does not attempt to analyse modality, or to explain the principles or
the nature of the elements. It attempts merely to systematize our modal
intuitions via the Leibnizian schema (L). And this modest goal is met so long
as every instance of (L) comes out true and the right pattern of inferences
among our modal intuitions is preserved. This in turn requires only that the
elements are sufficiently numerous, that they constitute a complete atomic
Boolean algebra, and that this algebraic structure reflects the relations
among the Ps. What all that means, in effect, is that the only requirement
which (M) places on selection is eligibility – eligibility exhausts the role (M)
defines for selection. So it does not matter which eligible selection relation is
in fact the meaning of ‘selects’; any would do equally well the job which (M)
requires of it. So the magical ersatzer need not decide among them. He can
allow that ‘selects’ is vague: its meaning fails to determine any particular one
of innumerable equally good, i.e., eligible, candidate selection relations. This
vagueness is harmless, given (M)’s limited goals. And vagueness certainly
does not mean unintelligibility, or we are all in trouble. (One can grasp a
vague term even if one grasps none of its precisifications – the innumerate
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can grasp ‘baldness’, those ignorant of water-droplets can grasp ‘cloud’, etc.)
In this case, ‘selects’ is easily grasped: we need grasp only the schema (S)
itself and the notion of eligibility. There is no more to its meaning to be
grasped. And grasping these seems unproblematic. In particular, it does not
presuppose a grasp of any specific Qs or of any specific candidate selection
relation at all – that would be to grasp more than is involved in the meaning
of ‘selects’. So even if Lewis is right that every one of these candidates is
ungraspable, ‘selects’ itself is still graspable.
(One might object that this sort of indeterminacy is not analogous to
more familiar sorts of vagueness: there is no natural ordering among the
candidate meanings for ‘selects’, and it is not sorites-susceptible, for instance.
But the more familiar sorts of vagueness all include this sort of inde-
terminacy, even if they include more besides. So the obvious intelligibility
of vague terms shows that indeterminacy does not automatically mean
unintelligibility. It is hard to see how, e.g., a failure of sorites-susceptibility
or some other such disanalogy would undermine this.)
In short, the magical ersatzer can take ‘selects’ to be vague, in which case
it is graspable even if each specific instance of (S) is ungraspable.
A final worry: in effect, I have assimilated Lewis’ objection to the familiar
problem of semantic underdetermination, how to explain our grasp of a
term – in this case, ‘selects’ – when we grasp too little to pin down a determ-
inate meaning for it, too little to decide between various candidate meanings
– in this case, all the instances of (S). And I have pointed out two familiar
solutions: posit naturalness to single out one of the candidates as the mean-
ing; or take ‘selects’ to be vague, indeterminate in meaning between the
eligible candidates. But one might protest. The problem of semantic under-
determination is pervasive: it afflicts nearly all our terms. Yet surely Lewis’
objection turns on features peculiar to selection, in particular on its extreme
underdetermination. The elements are entirely beyond our ken, and we
know (almost) nothing about their intrinsic properties. It is not just that
we lack a sufficient grasp of the Qs to pin down a specific instance of (S), it is
that ‘we have not the slightest idea what ... [the Qs] are; except that they are
properties whereby a vast flock of abstract simples differ from one another’
(PW, p. ). The problem with selection, one might say, is not just the
familiar one of underdetermination, but the highly unusual one of (almost)
no determination at all!
Here the magical ersatzer should stand firm. The underdetermination of
‘selects’ is indeed extreme, but so what? After all, the problem of semantic
underdetermination is not a matter of degree; it arises for any under-
determined term, regardless of whether this is slightly underdetermined
(such as ‘green’), very underdetermined (such as ‘plus’), or almost completely
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underdetermined (‘selects’). Neither of my solutions presupposes a prior
grasp of any specific Qs at all, or even of the nature of Qs in general (except
perhaps that they are intrinsic ‘properties whereby a vast flock of abstract
simples differ from one another’). They account for a grasp of ‘selects’
regardless of the extent of its underdetermination, even if this is almost
complete.
To summarize, Lewis asks how the magical ersatzer grasps the crucial
primitive ‘selects’. Not by causal acquaintance with the instances of
selection, nor via a list. Nor, he argues, via an instance of (S), at least if selec-
tion is internal. For then it depends on the intrinsic properties of the
elements – the Qs – and these are more or less entirely beyond our acquain-
tance. So if the magical ersatzer understands his own theory, this can only
be by magic.
One way for the magical ersatzer to respond is to posit a natural (or most
natural) relation pairing the Ps and Qs. This provides the resources to grasp
many of the Qs (by description) and to determine a specific meaning for
‘selects’, via (Sn), without requiring any acquaintance with the Qs. Another
way is to take ‘selects’ to be vague, indeterminate in meaning among the
eligible candidates. In that case, grasping ‘selects’ would require only a grasp
of the schema (S) and the notion of eligibility, neither of which requires any
acquaintance with the Qs.
Finally, the magical ersatzer should not be spooked by the fact that we
know next to nothing about the Qs. Lewis’ problem is the familiar one
of semantic underdetermination. And this problem and the applicability of
the solutions are insensitive to the degree of underdetermination.
I conclude that Lewis’ argument does not show that an internal selection
relation would be ungraspable, or even that it generates any difficulties
peculiar to (M).
VI. PREMISE (): AN EXTERNAL SELECTION RELATION
WOULD BE UNINTELLIGIBLE
This time Lewis objects to the very existence of an external selection
relation, not just to our putative grasp of it. He argues as follows. In order
for selection to play its assigned role in (M), it must be a ‘modal’ relation, for
when the concrete world selects various elements, it does so in virtue of what
it is like. If the concrete world has donkeys among its parts, for instance,
then it must select certain elements; if it has no blue swans among its parts, it
must fail to select certain others; and so on. (This is what justifies thinking of
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the elements as representational.) In particular, selection is constrained
by the intrinsic properties of the concrete world.
But that means it cannot be external. For it is unintelligible that an
external relation should be constrained by the intrinsic properties of the
relata, except perhaps by magic. Certainly it is unintelligible that there
should be spatiotemporal relations that are so constrained:
It cannot be, for instance, that there is an absolutely necessary connection ... whereby
every charged particle must be exactly a certain distance from another particle. It’s
one thing for a particle to be charged, another thing for two particles to be at a
certain distance – the common involvement of the same particle is not enough to
make the alleged connection intelligible (PW, pp. –).
And as before, ‘we know of no external relations except the (strictly or
analogically) spatiotemporal ones’ (PW, p. ). Moreover, such a connec-
tion would violate our intuitions about intrinsicality, about the natures of
things (PW, p. ):
What makes a relation external, I would have thought, exactly is that it holds
independently of the natures of the two relata.
  I ask: how can these connections be necessary? It seems to be one fact that some-
where within the concrete world, a donkey talks; and an entirely independent fact that
the concrete world enters into a certain external relation with this element and not
with that. What stops it from going the other way?
In short, (M) requires a necessary connection between facts about the
concrete world’s intrinsic nature on the one hand and facts about which
elements it selects on the other. But our intuitions about spatiotemporal
relations (the only known external relations) and intrinsicality point to the
unintelligibility of any such connection if selection is external.
VII. WHY THE ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE ()
IS UNCONVINCING
This argument too is unconvincing. For one thing, it can apparently be
parodied. The has-a-length-in-metres-of relation which concrete particulars
bear to numbers is, presumably, external; whether or not it obtains seems
independent of the intrinsic properties of numbers (whatever they might be).
But it is constrained by the intrinsic properties of the first relatum: lengths are
intrinsic properties. So, like selection, the has-a-length-in-metres-of relation is
a modal external relation. Yet certainly it is intelligible.
(One might instead hold that distinct numbers all differ intrinsically and
that any intrinsic duplicates of  will number things just as  does. Then the
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has-a-length-in-metres-of relation would be internal, and the parody fails.
But the parody still suggests that something is awry. For it shows that if
Lewis is right, the assumption must be rejected. This is highly suspicious.
Should not questions about the intrinsic properties of numbers and
their role in determining the lengths in metres of concrete things remain
open? After all, most of us have no idea whether numbers are intrinsic
duplicates, or indeed whether they have intrinsic properties at all, let alone
what their roles are.)
For another thing, the argument seems to prove too much. Only two
assumptions prevent all Leibnizian theories of modality, including modal
realism, from falling within its scope: that the elements are abstract
simples, and that selection is external. But the abstractness and simplicity
of the elements play no role in this argument. So all Leibnizian theories of
modality which classify (their analogues of ) selection as external fall
within its scope, and should be accounted unintelligible. In particular,
modal realism itself is threatened. Its analogue of selection is the member-
ship relation (‘... the elements are the sets of worlds, the concrete world
selects just those elements that have it as a member’). And membership
is external: it is clearly intrinsic, and yet it varies among duplicates of
the relata.12
One obvious weakness in the argument is the analogy with spatio-
temporal relations. Spatiotemporal relations hold among concrete con-
tingent particulars capable of intrinsic change, whereas the range of
selection consists of abstract and presumably necessarily existent and
intrinsically immutable entities, viz the elements. With respect to the relata,
the has-a-length-in-metres-of relation is a better analogue for selection than
spatiotemporal relations. And it is modal. Indeed, among external relations
with an abstract second relatum – has-a-length-in-metres-of, membership,
instantiation – some sort of necessary connection or other seems to be the
rule. The unintelligibility of modal spatiotemporal relations, then, is not a
compelling reason to reject modal external relations like selection which
have an abstract second relatum.
(One might object that these relations are poor analogues for selection
because they are not natural; spatiotemporal relations are the only known
natural external relations. But there can be only one reason to require that
selection itself must be natural: graspability. Thus Lewis (PW, p. ):
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12 A simple argument shows this: let x and x* be distinct duplicates. Now x is a member of
its singleton {x}, but x* is not. Yet {x}, like everything else, is a duplicate of itself. So x is a
member of {x}, while a duplicate of x, viz x*, is not a member of a duplicate of {x}, viz {x}
itself. Peter van Inwagen was the first to make this point: ‘Two Concepts of Possible Worlds’,
pp. ff.
[If] selection is not any kind of natural relation ... [then] there is nothing to it but a list
– a list entirely out of reach of our thought and language ... so again it’s magic if the
ersatzer understands his own primitive [‘selects’].
And if graspability is the issue, these other relations qualify as analogues for
selection after all – natural or not, we clearly manage to grasp their pre-
dicates somehow.) 
There is also a second and more fundamental weakness. What Lewis
objects to is a necessary connection between two sorts of facts: facts about
what the concrete world is like intrinsically, on the one hand, and facts
about which elements it selects externally, on the other (PW, p. ):
I ask: how can these connections be necessary? It seems to be one fact that somewhere
within the concrete world, a donkey talks; and an entirely independent fact that the
concrete world enters into a certain external relation with this element and not with
that. What stops it from going the other way?
But nothing in (M) requires these facts to be distinct at all. On the contrary,
theoretical economy requires them to be identical. In general, the magical
ersatzer should say that the fact that the concrete world selects, say, element
e just is the fact that the concrete world is, say, F. To describe this one fact in
terms of the selection of elements is to attribute to it a certain structure and
existential commitments; but that is to analyse it, not to posit some additional
fact magically connected with it. And then, of course, any mystery about a
necessary connection evaporates: necessarily, the concrete world is F iff the
concrete world selects e, simply because nothing can vary independently of
itself (regardless of whether or not selection is external).
Admittedly, it sounds odd to say that containing donkeys is the very same
thing as (externally) selecting an element. But in part, this is just unfamiliar
terminology. Call the elements ‘intrinsic properties’ and selection ‘instan-
tiation’ instead, and it sounds less odd: ‘Containing donkeys is the same
thing as instantiating an intrinsic property’. In part, it is probably also
nominalistic queasiness about reifying from predicates. But nominalistic
worries are quite general; they have nothing specifically to do with (M). In
fact, the internal/external distinction itself already presupposes such rei-
fication; it is not even statable without quantifying over properties. In part, it
may also be an assumption that if something is related to an intrinsic
property it must be related ‘internally’. But this assumption is entirely
unwarranted. Anyway, it is not that odd: the facts clearly can be abstracted
from; they have some structure or other. (And it is not as if we are iden-
tifying the elements with the donkeys themselves!) Moreover, oddity is not
unintelligibility; any unintelligibility still remains to be argued for. Lewis’
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argument bears only on the intelligibility of a connection between two
distinct sorts of facts, not on the intelligibility of identifying them.13
To summarize, Lewis argues that it is unintelligible that facts about what
the concrete world is like intrinsically and facts about which elements it
selects externally should be necessarily connected. But his grounds consist
only in a dubious analogy with spatiotemporal relations. And there is no
reason to think these are really two sorts of facts at all; the magical ersatzer
will presumably identify them, rendering any connection quite un-
mysterious, whatever the nature of selection. Any remaining questions seem
to be quite general and have nothing specifically to do with (M) or necessary
connections between distinct facts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The problem which Lewis points out for classifying selection as internal
is amenable to some familiar solutions, despite the extreme under-
determination of ‘selects’. His argument against classifying selection as
external is not compelling, and relies on a false presupposition, viz that facts
about what the concrete world is like and facts about which elements it
selects are two sorts of fact. Either way, then, he has given us no good
reason to reject (M) and its instances.14
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13 Does this proposed identification, a referee asked, throw any light on the previous issue of
graspability? Not really. Suppose that as the identification suggests, the elements just are the
Ps, the intrinsic properties of the concrete world. Then, in effect, selection is just the instan-
tiation relation. If selection is internal, the intrinsic features of the properties themselves partly
determine whether or not the concrete world instantiates them. But these features are still
beyond our acquaintance. The identification merely transforms any difficulties with grasping
selection into difficulties with grasping instantiation.
14 I am grateful to Phillip Bricker and Neil Feit for their invaluable help with a distant
ancestor of this paper. I am also grateful to anonymous referees; one in particular made a
number of very helpful comments, prompting substantial rewriting of parts of the paper.
